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THE DISCOVERY OF THE SOUL.
BY PROF. F. MAX MUELLER.
Physical Religion beginning with the belief in
agents behind the great phenomena of nature, reached
its highest point when it had led the human mind to a
belief in one Supreme Agent or God. It was supposed
that this God could be implored bj' prayers and pleased
by sacrifices. He was called the father of gods and
men. Yet even in his highest conception he was no
more than what Cardinal Newman defined God to be.
"I mean by the Supreme Being," he wrote, "one who
is simpl}' self-dependent, and the only being who is
such. I mean that he created all things out of noth-
ing, and could destro}' them as easily as he made
them, and that, in consequence, he is separated from
them bj' an abyss, and incommunicable in all his at-
tributes." This abyss, separating God from man, re-
mains at the end of physical religion. It constitutes
its inherent weakness ; but this very weakness became,
in time, a source of strength, for from it sprang a
yearning for better things. The despairing utterances
of Job, "Man lieth down and riseth not," and of the
Psalmist, " The dead cannot praise God, neither any
that go down into darkness," are but the natural con-
sequence of that abyss which had been fixed by Phys-
ical Religion between God and man, between the In-
finite and the finite.
The history of religion teaches us that a belief in
the Divine in Nature does not and cannot yield any
satisfaction to a desire for a more intimate relation
with the gods or with God, and to the irrepressible
yearning for immortality. That satisfaction, so far as
history allows us to see, came from a different source,
from what I call Anthropological Religion, or the dis-
covery of the Divine in man.
We cannot take the name and concept of a soul in
man for granted, and proceed at once to the question
how that soul came to be considered as immortal. We
have to find out, first of all, how such a thing as a
soul was ever spoken of and thought of. To us the
two words, "body and soul," are so familiar that it
seems almost childish to ask the question how man at
first came to speak of body and soul. But to have
framed a name for soul is by no means a small achieve-
ment, and I have no doubt that it took the labor of
many generations before it could be accomplished.
We saw how long it took to frame a name for God.
We also saw that man could never have framed such
a name unless Nature had taken him b}' her hand, and
made him see something beyond what he saw in the
fire, in the wind, in the sun, and in the sky. The first
steps were made very easy for him. He spoke of the
fire that warmed him, of the wind that refreshed him,
of the sun that gave him light, and of the sky that was
above all things, and by thus simply speaking of what
they all did for him, he spoke of agents behind them
all, and at last of an Agent behind all the agencies of
Nature. We shall find that the process which led to
the discovery of the soul, and the framing of names for
soul, was much the same. There was no conclave of
sages, who tried to find out whether man had a soul,
and what should be its name. If we follow the vestiges
of language, the only true vestiges of all intellectual
creations, we shall find that here also man began b}'
naming the simplest and most palpable things, and
that here, also, by simply dropping what was purely
external, he found himself by slow degrees in posses-
sion of names which told him of the existence of a
soul.
It is clear that in the case of the soul, as in the
case of all other abstract objects, the first name and
the first concept were necessarily formed from material
objects. The soul, as we conceive it as an invisible,
intangible, immaterial object, could never have been
named, and if it could not be named, could never have
been conceived. But what could be named and con-
ceived was the blood or the heart, and, better still,
the breath, the actual spiritus or spirit that went in
and out of the mouth and the nostrils. Take whatever
dictionary you like, and you will find how the words
for soul, if the}' can be analysed at all, invariably point
back to a material origin, and invariably disclose the
process by which they were freed from their material
fetters.
It may be asked. What has our belief in a soul to
do with a belief in God? And, to judge from many
works on religion, and, more particularlj', on the ori-
gin of religion, it might seem indeed as if man could
have a religion, could believe in gods and in one God,
without believing in his own soul, without having
even a name or a concept of soul. It is true that no
creed enjoins a belief in a soul as it enjoins a belief
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in God ; and yet, what is the object, nay, what can be
the meaning of our saying, "I beheve in God," un-
less we can say at the same time, "I believe in my
soul "?
The belief in a soul, however, exactly like the be-
lief in Gods, and at last, in one God, can only be
looked upon as the outcome of a long historical growth.
It must be studied in the annals of language, in those
ancient words which, meaning originally something
quite tangible and visible, came in time to mean some-
thing semi tangible, something intangible, nay, some-
thing infinite in man. The soul is to man what God
is to the universe.
When we remember what is now a fact doubted
by no one, that every Avord in every language had
originally a material meaning, we shall easily under-
stand why that which at the dissolution of the body
seemed to have departed, and which we consider the
most immaterial of all things, should have been called
at first by the name of something material—namel}',
the airy breath. This was the first step in human
psychology. The next step was to use that word
"breath" not only for the breath which had left the
body, but likewise for all that formerly existed in the
body— the feelings, the perceptions, the conceptions,
and that wonderful network of feelings and thoughts
which constituted the man, such as he was in life.
For all this depended on the breath. The third step was
equally natural, though it soon led into a wilderness
of imaginations. If the breath, with all that belonged
to it, had departed, then it must exist somewhere
after its departure, and that somewhere, though ut-
terly unknown and unknowable, was soon painted in
all the colors that love, fear, and hope could supply.
These three consecutive steps are not mere theory,
they have left their footprints in language, and even
in our own language these footprints are not yet alto-
gether effaced.
This linguistic process which led to the formation
of words for the different phases of the intellectual life
of man is full of interest, and deserves a far more
careful treatment than it has hitherto received, par-
ticularly at the hands of the professed psychologist.
What is quite clear is that all the words of the psy-
chological terminology, for instance the Homeric ex-
pressions "Psyche," "Menos," "Thymos," "Phrenes,"
begin as names of material objects and processes, such
as heart, chest, breath, and commotion, just as the
names of the gods begin with the storm-wind, the fire,
the sun, and the sky. At first every one of these
words was capable of the widest application. But
very soon there began a process of mutual friction and
determination, one word being restricted idiomatically
to the vital breath of the life, shared in common by
man and beast, other words being assigned to the pas-
sions, the will, the memory, to knowledge, under-
standing, and reasoning.
We have seen that the way which led to the dis-
covery of a soul was clearly pointed out to man, as
was the way which led to the discovery of the gods.
It was the breath which almost visibly left the body
at the time of death that suggested the name of breath,
and afterwards the thought of something breathing,
living, perceiving, willing, remembering, and thinking
within us. The name came first, the name of mate-
rial breath. By dropping what seemed material even
in this airy breath, there remained the concept of
what we call the soul.
The belief in the continued existence of the soul
after death, and in its liability to rewards and punish-
ments, seem as irresistible to-day as in the days of
Plato. We cannot say that a belief in rewards and
punishments is universal. We look for it in vain in
the Old Testament or in Homer. But when that be-
lief has once presented itself to the human mind, it
holds its own against all objections. It is possible, no
doubt, to object to the purely human distinction be-
tween rewards and punishments, because, from a
higher point of view, punishment itself may be called
a reward. Even eternal punishment, as Charles Kings-
ley used to say, is but another name for eternal love,
and the very fire of hell may be taken as a childish
expression only for the constant purification of the
soul. All this may be conceded, if only the continu-
ity of cause and effect between this life and the next
is preserved. But when we come to the next q ue
tion, whether the departed, as has been fondly sup-
posed, are able to feel, not only what concerns them,
but likewise what concerns their friends on earth, we
may call this a very natural deduction, a very intelli-
gible hope, we may even admit that no evidence can
be brought forward against it, but beyond that we
cannot go.
Man, if left to himself, has everywhere arrived at
the conviction that there is something in man or of
man besides the material body. This was a lesson
taught not so much by life as by death. Besides the
body, besides the heart, besides the blood, there was
the breath. Man was struck by that, and when the
breath had left the body at death, he simply stated the
fact, that the breath or the psyche had departed. All
the speculations on the true nature of \.\v3X psyche with-
in, belong to the domain of Psychology.
A mere study of language would show how general,
nay, how universal, is the belief in something beside
the body, in some agent within, or of what in Sanskrit
is called by a very general name, the antahkarana,
the agency within. Every kind of internal agency
was ascribed to that something which showed itself
not only as simply breathing and living, but as feeling
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and perceiving, soon also as naming, conceiving, and
reasoning. In our lectures on Anthropological Re-
ligion we have had chiefly to deal with the specula-
lations which arose from that psyche, as no longer
within, but as after death tc'ithoiit the bod}'. Here also
language began with the name of breath. The breath
had gone, the /jyr//c had departed. ThaX psyche, how-
ever, was not conceived as mere breath or air, but as
retaining most of those activities which had been
ascribed to it during life, such as feeling, perceiving,
naming, conceiving, and reasoning. So far I do not
see what can be brought forward against this primitive
and universal form of belief. If there was a some-
thing in man that could receive, perceive, and con-
ceive, that something, whatever name we call it, was
gone with death. But no one could think that it had
been annihilated
—
niinquam nihil ex aliquo. So long,
therefore, as the ancient philosophers said no more
than that this something, called breath or psyche, had
left the body and had gone somewhere else, I do not
see what counter-argument could stop them. Even
during life, the body alone, though it could live by it-
self, could not be said to see or hear or perceive by
itself. The eye by itself does not see, it requires some-
thing else to receive and to perceive, and that some-
thing, though itself invisible, was as real as the invis-
ible Infinite and the Divine behind the agents in nature,
whom we call the gods of the ancient world. It be-
came in turn the soul, the mind, the agent, the subject,
till at last it was recognised as the Infinite and the
Divine in man.
In our longings for the departed we often think of
them as young or old, we think of them as man or
woman, as father or mother, as husband or wife.
Even nationality and language are supposed to remain,
and we often hear expressions, "Oh, if the souls a-re
without all this, without age, without sex, without na-
tional character, without even their native language,
what will they be to us?" The answer is, they will
really be the same to us as they were in this life. Un-
less we can bring ourselves to believe that a soul has
a beginning, and that our souls sprang into being at
the time of our birth, the soul within us must have
existed before.
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting ;
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And Cometh from afar.
But however convinced we may be of the soul's
eternal existence, we shall always remain ignorant as
to how it existed. And yet we do not murmur or com-
plain. Our soul on awakening here is not quite a
stranger to itself and the souls who as our parents,
our wives and husbands, our children and our friends,
have greeted us at first as strangers in this life, but
have become to us as if we had known them for ever.
and as if we could never lose them again. If it were
to be so again in the next life, if there also we should
meet at first as strangers till drawn together by the
same mysterious love that has drawn us together here,
why should we murmur or complain ? Thousands of
years ago we read of a husband telling his wife, " Verily
a wife is not dear, that you may love the wife ; but
that you maj' love the soul, therefore a wife is dear."
What does that mean ? It means that true love con-
sists, not in loving what is perishable, but in discov-
ering and loving what is eternal in man or woman.
THE LOGIC OF DIFFERENTIATION.
BY HELEN A. CLARKE.
It is a question in m}' mind whether the present
tendenc}' of science is not to exalt be5'ond its proper
sphere the law of differentiation. Can the most highly
differentiated or specialised product of nature be
proved to be, on the whole, the highest product in an}-
but a relative sense? It seems to me that differentia-
tion carried too far must end either in stagnation or
decay. No one will den)' that the differentiation which
has resulted in a species of animals that can swim and
live in the water makes them far superior to man in
this respect, but who will dare to saj' that the}' are,
on this account, a higher product of nature than man ?
The same is true of the differentiation which has re-
sulted in flying. And what is the price which these
highly differentiated beings have paid for their supe-
riority in this line ? Simply that they are forever cut
off from all progress; their individuality is reduced to
a minimum, they can fly and swim beautifully, but
they can do precious little else except reproduce their
kind.
When man first came upon the scene, whatever
may have been the producing forces of a condition
favorable to his appearance, Nature found herself
face to face with a new sort of material in the rough,
in which there were latent immense possibilities for
intellectual and spiritual development and over which
she was to wield her differentiating sway. And from
her task she has never flinched until, to give a few
examples, we have, here, a dancing, flirting, vain, self-
ish species of man, and there a toiling, moiling spe-
cies ; here a race of millionaires, and there, a race of
paupers ; here we have a genus which can write the
most learned essays, and yet cannot enjoy the finest
musical' composition in the world ; there a genus which
will grow rapturous over a symphony, and call Her-
bert Spencer "stuff"; here a sex whose standard is
morality, and there a sex whose standard is immoral-
ity. Mind protoplasm, so to speak, has been under-
going the process of differentiation into just so many
birds and fishes of the mind kingdom. Now, the
question is, " Is this a course of things which is going
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to bring about the greatest sum of happiness to the
human race ?"
It is quite conceivable that if the birds and fishes
of the animal kingdom had had their choice of being
supr&me flyers or supreme swimmers, or of foregoing
this special supremacy for the sake of the greater pos-
sibilities opened out in becoming members of the hu-
man race, they would have chosen the latter. Shall
we for the first time fully aroused and conscious of
nature's differentiating methods do everything in our
power to further her designs until we have so many
species of perfected and isolated specialists that no
farther general progress will be possible?—unless still
another sort of un-differentiated, homogeneous being
should be kind enough to make his appearance and
give Nature another chance.
I do not see what good there was in our finding
out this law of nature if we are only to go on con-
sciously doing the same thing we have been uncon-
sciously doing for millions of ages. It would be about
as sensible to insist that after the discovery of the
law of gravitation men should have made a point of
tumbling down as often as possible in order to show
their appreciation of Nature's beneficent law and aid
her in carrying it out. The truth is that men are
slaves to the laws of nature only so long as they re-
main unconscious of them. As soon as they have
found them out, the laws of nature become their
slaves. The destructive lightning is chained and made
to do the duty which was once done by a farthing
candle.
It is just here that man has such an enormous ad-
vantage over the lower animals, and if he lets nature
develop him into fishes and birds, he is ignoring his
own most distinctive characteristic, and one which
ought to prevent his blotting out the progress of the
race by overspecialisation.
I have been led to make these remarks mainly on
account of the use which scientists are making of the
argument of differentiation against woman. For hun-
dreds of centuries, religion has been made to bear
witness against her, and, now, just when a new day
seemed to be dawning, and the pernicious results of
religious superstition are being thrown off, she is to be
subjected to a material superstition which bids fair to
make her fight for independence harder than it has
ever been
; for science scorning the spiritual sceptres
of the human past as unbecoming our fuller knowledge
yet inconsistently bows in abject servitude to the ma-
terial sceptres of an ante-human past. The scientific
man is so much taken up with his new found ances-
tors, the beasts of the field, and he is so delighted with
the resemblances which he perceives to exist between
them and himself that he is for modeling his life on
their plan, and he either ignores, or issues scientific
Bulls against any tendency he may observe to escape
what he calls the fundamental laws of nature.
Nature, having divided the men off from the women,
it is the duty of the human race, says the scientist,
to follow her lead and emphasise this dividing as much
as possible. Now, it is rather a curious fact that, al-
though they preach the practicability of as much sub-
differentiation and specialisation
—
provided the main
line of differentiation from women is preserved—as
possible among men, they declare that women must
remain among themselves a highly differentiated whole
of men-pleasing, child bearing, house-keeping beings.
Fortunately, for the women, they possess a con-
sciousness which the poor birds and fishes of the past
did not possess, and although they perceive that every
opportunity is given them to become specialists in
one line, they prefer the larger possibilities which
open out to them in considering themselves homo-
geneous, and capable, like men, of further sub-differ-
entiation.
Since, spite of their sex difference, men and women
do possess many points of likeness, the tendency of
this sub-differentiation has been to make men and
women—not more different, but more alike—at least
intellectually. But intellectuality is tending to spirit-
ualise woman more and more ; and, no doubt, much
to the chagrin of the materially superstitious scientist,
there is being developed a species of woman in which
the sex instinct is reduced to a minimum, and to whom
love can come only in the person of a being spiritually
and intellectually like herself. While a lower kind of
love may be founded in difference, the higher kind of
love which alone endures can only be founded in fun-
damental likeness.
To illustrate, we may suppose the point in evolu-
tion reached where the sexes have become completely
differentiated. Such a point once reached, there are
but three things which could happen, either men and
women must grow farther and farther apart, or they
must continue to occupy the same relative position to-
wards each other, or they must grow closer together.
If nature is servilely aided in her differentiating plan,
she will take men off to one pole and women off to the
other and there will be no bringing them together on
any but the lowest sexual plane. The men who "fly"
will find the women who can hardly even "swim"
most uninteresting personages and will either prey
upon them or leave them alone altogether, either of
which would result in the decay of the race.
If, on the other hand, nature be supposed to have
assigned men and women their place permanently at
the point where their difference is emphasised, rather
than their likeness, there can be no real friendship nor
sympathy between them. Men will have either in-
tellectual or "fast" pursuits, women, domestic or
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frivolous pursuits, and the inevitable result will be
that they will have little but an ephemeral sexual at-
traction for each other, their lives will not harmonise
and the result will be stagnation.
Should, however, men and women both wisely use
the laws of differentiation, the result must be that they
will grow more and more alike intellectually and spirit-
ually and an increase of sympathy between them will
be the result.
If we look about us we are led to the conclusion
that so far, women alone, and, of course only some of
them, have been exercising this guiding influence on
differentiation. Men have either stood still at the
point where the differentiation became emphasised,
representing, broadl}' speaking, orthodox superstition,
or they have enrolled themselves as slaves to nature's
law and followed the direction which represents scien-
tific superstition. In either case they are getting far-
ther away from those women who are developing
their spiritual as well as their intellectual instincts,
and who will have nothing to do with men, however
intelligent, who insist on the supremacy of animal in-
stincts.
That what I have said of developing womanhood,
is true, is proved on every side by the fact that many
a woman is finding her companion for life in another
woman, in whose love and sympathy the higher needs
of her nature are fulfilled, and scientists may talk as
they will about her duties to the human race, she has
found out the sacredness of her duty to herself and
never again-will she be willing to fulfil duties to the
race, unless they are raised to a plane where they will
not conflict with her intellectual and moral ideals.
From the foregoing remarks it will be seen that
differentiation may be used to bring about likeness
as well as difference, and having become conscious of
its laws, it is our duty so to use them as to bring about
the highest development of the human race.
There may come a time when the work of the
specialists will be accomplished ; when the human in-
tellect will be able to grasp universal knowledge, from
which alone springs universal sympathy, and with
that, greater happiness than the specialist ever dreamed
of in his philosophy ; when the musician shall be in
sympathy with the scientist, and the scientist shall
not scoff at the poet. In fact, a suspicion will cross
my mind at times, that Nature herself is tending to
produce not a heterogeneous crowd of differentiated
noodles but beings who will unite, in one glorious
world-embracing synthesis, the knowledge which her
slaves the specialists have developed to that stage
where the new order of beings can seize and ripen it
in the warmth of all other knowledge. But it rests
with man to decide whether he shall be that being or
whether it is to be a species yet unborn.
ENGLISH REFORMERS AND AMERICAN PRISONS.
BV GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.
The Howard Association for the promotion of the best meth-
ods of the Treatment and Prevention of Crime and Pauperism
have issued a leaflet entitled " The collegiate and hotel prisons of
the United States, iSgi." (Office: 5 Bishopsgate Street, London.)
We notice this tract at some length because the subject mat-
ter of it is of great importance ; and because of the philanthropic
services of John Howard, whose humane example is the inspira-
tion and vitality of the useful institution which bears his name.
As the life of John Howard was devoted to the abolition of crimes,
the mitigation of penalties, and the reformation of criminals, it
grates a little harshly upon the feelings that an association organ-
ised to carry on his work, should issue a pamphlet complaining
that the treatment of criminals in the prisons of the United States
is not sufficiently painful and severe. The foundation of its argu-
ment is the following statement
:
"American criminality is so alarmingly increasing, tliat whereas in 1S50,
every million inhabitants of the United States only contributed ago prisoners,
the proportion had risen to a^s in 1S70 and as high as i,i6c) in the million in
iSSo. The census of 1S90 appears to indicate a still further increase of crimi-
nality; there being 10,000 more 'convicts' than in iSSo."
These figures are misleading, and they show us with what in-
genuity statistics may be used to reveal and conceal the truth. In
that one extract the words "prisoners," "criminality," and "con-
victs," are synonymously used; whereas, in fact, a "prisoner"
maybe neither criminal nor convict, a "criminal" neither con-
vict nor prisoner, and a "convict" may be not a criminal nor in
prison, for his conviction may be for the violation of some petty
city ordinance involving no moral turpitude whatever. The
figures are misleading also because they make no discrimination
between crimes, mala in se and crimes which are merely ina/a
proltibita. In one year 7,566 persons were imprisoned in the Chi-
cago house of correction, and all but igo of them were incarcer-
ated for non-payment of fines. Yet in the statistics used by the
Howard Association they all appear as "convicts."
In compiling those figures no notice is taken of the multipli-
cation of statutory offenses which is constantly going on in the
United States. We have about fifty legislatures in this country
and they spend the winter time in making laws prohibiting and
making criminal various deeds of commission and omission which
are perfectly innocent in themselves. The "criminality" de-
plored by the Howard Association may be obstructing the side-
walk, killing game for food instead of sport, peddling, pulling a
tooth without a license, or some such heinous thing.
The Association complains that "criminals and vagrants in
America are treated with a leniency which is positively cruel to
the honest community." By this leniency, remarks that admir-
able society, "the Americans have sought to reverse the Divine
ordinance that the law should be a terror to evil-doers." Only a
hundred years ago, and even down to the reign of George the
Fourth, platoons of malefactors were hanged every Monday
morning at Tyburn corner in London, or in front of the Newgate
prison ; while hundreds of others were transported to the penal
settlements at Botany Bay ; and yet the law was not a greater
terror to evil-doers then, than it was after John Howard and his
disciples had forced the "Divine ordinance" of mercy into the
sanguinary criminal code of England.
The Howard Association criticises our habit of pampering
convicts ; and with good reason, if the following statement is true :
"Thus some prisons in the United States, such as Elmira and Concord,
have introduced " the collegiate system," for rendering proficiency in study a
chief test of the fitness of their inmates for liberation. These and other Amer-
ican prisons provide their inmates with a sumptuous dietary. Thus at the
California state prison of Folsom the convicts are not even obliged to work.
If they choose to remain idle and lounge about in gangs they may do so ; and
still have every day a meat diet with coffee and vegetables. If they volunteer
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to work at the quarries near the prison they are rewarded with soups, syrups,
tea and cake and meat suppers. A third grade secures for them chops and
steaks for breakfast as well as supper, with hot rolls and fruit, and a dinner
worthy of a good hotel."
We admit that this is maudlin bene.olence, and that it strains
the quality of mercy to the breaking point, but we think there is a
mistake as to the " menu." We half suspect also that the Howard
Association circulated this tract as a sinister inducement to the crim-
inal classes of London to emigrate, and thereby save the taxpayers
of that village the expense of supporting them at Millbank or Pen-
tonville. What is the use of passing laws to exclude European
criminals from this country so long as the Howard Association
persists in telling them that this is the paradise of convicts, where
they may revel in luxury and idleness, besides receiving when in
prison all the advantages of a "collegiate " education. Are the
members of the Howard Association sufficiently aware of the aw-
ful responsibility they assume when they thus lead their English
brethren into temptation ? We hope that this leaflet has not been
translated into foreign languages and circulated on the continent
of Europe ; but if it has been, we warn the criminal classes there
not to be led astray by it, for if they come over here and get into
an American penitentiary expecting to receive hotel fare and a
collegiate course of education they will be wofully disappointed.
Some of the criticisms directed specially against the Elmira
system will apply to the " reformatory " principle in every other
prison in the world, and they make strong arguments in its favor ;
as for instance, this :
•'C
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baccarat banker and a gambler ; because his presence there in that
capacity rubbed a little more veneering off that venerable super-
stition which is known as monarchy. Whatever brings that ancient
institution into contempt is regarded as a gain to political civilisa-
tion ; and the sordid pastimes of the prince tarnish the crown
which the exemplary life of his mother made radiant. This bac-
carat scandal as they call it shortens the reign of royalty and caste
in England. It shows to the English people of what common clay
their titled aristocracy is made. It will do greater service than
that, for it will lower the fence that divides cheating from gaming,
and hasten the time when they will be compelled to graze in the
same pasture. The difference between winning money fairly and
winning it by cheating is only of degree. Neither is honest, but
one is a little more dishonest than the other. The fashionable
world of London affects to be greatly shocked that there should be
cheating at cards by one of the Prince's own set, a baronet and
lieutenant colonel of the guards, and the Prince himself in the
witness box dolefully referred to the thimble-rig performance at
Tranby Croft as " a sad event" ; not the gambling, nor even the
cheating, but the detection and exposure of the cheat. The Prince
is a grandfather now, and old enough to know that every winning
of money by gambling, no matter how " square " the game, is " a
sad event." No man can honestly win, and take, and keep five
hundred dollars of another man's money, no matter how fair may
be his play according to the gambler's code.
M. M. Trumbull.
CORRESPONDENCE.
LAW PERMITS NO FREEDOM OF WILL.
To Ihe Editor of The Open Court :
If I misrepresented your view by stating that when a man
acts without any obstacle in his environment he is not under law,
it was because you claim that at such a time a man is free ; hence
you palter with monism in a double sense. What the thinkers of
this age are striving for is clearness of thought and logical expres-
sion. We have had confusion enough and bi.tter strife enough.
What we want now is, that which will tend to harmonise with
reason and bring " peace on earth and good will among men," but
I don't see how these can obtain from your definition of monism.
Because to say that you "accept determinism wholly and fully,
but from the same standpoint of monism freewill must also be
accepted," you make confusion instead of peace. You can, as an
individual, accept that contradiction, but you cannot truthfully
teach that doctrine for scientific truth ; for it is equivalent to say-
ing that two and two are four, but you must accept the doctrine
also, for certain reasons, that two and three are four. What we
want is clearness here. True monism does accept Determinism
wholly and fully ; it must, there is no alternative, but semi-re-
ligious monism need not. As Professor Huxley says, we must call
a spade a spade.
I can distinguish between your position and the pagan doctrine
of the freedom of the will and God's sovereignty, but your position
is equally at varience with reason. If you postulate the freedom
of the will because, in your opinion, it is best adapted to teach
morals, I grant you the right, but you must remember that upon
your own confession of determinism you assume an error that
good may come. Artificial morality may largely depend upon
teaching that untruth, but real morality, never !
The doctrine of scientific monism is not adapted to those who
need moral instruction ; it is for those who are moral. Under the
necessity of adaptation to condition, nature had to start with the
delusion of freewill. But we are now beginning to see face to
face and that delusion must go along with the doctrine of the re-
surrection of the body.
I agree with you that " man's actions are always according to
law, but I insist that his actions are caused by law—cause—and
therefore are not free. There is this difference between us : You
postulate freewill (after you have declared by determinism that
no such thing exists) for the sake of morality, while I deny it for
the sake of scientific monism, truth and consistency.
To say that nature is a slave to law, or cause is not stating a
dualism of cause and reality, because cause is reality. When I
say that nature cannot exist and can exist at the same time, I de-
clare a reality and at the same time show that nature cannot do both
.
The causes which govern forms are a part of nature, so when I
say that a man is caused to eat by reason of hunger, I state a real-
ity, not a dualism of cause and reality. I agree again, that " the
power that produced man is in him and that he is a part of it,"
but I insist that he is a subordinate part through and through, that
comes and goes by that which is not himself. When he is, nature
is one, and when he is not, nature is still one. With organisation
comes will, same as sight and hearing—nature's adaptation to ends.
The eye must see, the ear must hear, and the will must sense ac-
tion
; all these are affected by causes. The eye cannot see an ob-
ject if it is not there
; the ear cannot hear a sound if there is none
and the will cannot will unless there is something to repel or at-
tract it. A man's actions are not the results of himself alone
;
they are results of combinations of which he is always a factor,
but he is never the prime factor ; that honor belongs to nature,
and true monism must give it that honor, for all things proceed
from one.
There is no dualism here. The stalk is a necessary factor for
the production of corn, but it is not the prime factor because na-
ture evolves both stalk and corn. If nature could evolve corn
without a stalk it would not be governed by that law. Prof. Joseph
Le Conte is mistaken when he says " in organic evolution nature
operates
. .
.
without the co-operation of the thing evolving," be-
cause the stalk is as essential for corn as good men and women
are for the formation of a good environment.
Now instead of postulating an untruth for the purpose of
morality, in order to cause mankind to feel their responsibility,
would it not suit monism better to declare the undeniable truth
which harmonises with determinism, that man in his relation to
results is always a factor in the combination and therefore must be
held responsible ? Nature does not hold mankind responsible be-
cause they are free, but because, in the nature of things, it must.
John Maddock.
ARE WE THE SLAVES OF LAW ?
Clearness of thought can be attained only by giving plain
and unmistakable definitions. I have defined the term freewill as
I use it, repeatedly ; and it is not my fault if Mr. Maddock again
and again speaks of a freewill as a will which is not determined by
law. Everything is determined by law and also all the actions of
man are strictly and unequivocably determined by law. Not only
the actions, but also all the wishes, desires, and tendencies to act,
every and even the slightest commotion in our mind, every thought,
every hope and fear, they all arise according to strict and unalter-
able laws. Will is a tendency to act. If this tendency to act can
freely pass into act, I call the will free. If for some reason it is
prevented from passing into act, I observe that the will is under
constraint, it is not free. These are my definitions, and anyone
criticising my position has to bear m mind what I mean by " free.''
Mr. Maddock's definition of " free " seems to be " that which
is not determined by law," and of course if free means "not de-
termined by law," there is no freedom. But then the word "free "
would be a useless word and we should drop it entirely ; but we
should have to invent a new word for that which I understand by
free. It is apparent that there is a great difference between an
act which is performed without constraint and another act which
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is performed by some compulsion. If a man works because a
slave-driver stands behind him with a whip, his work is no moral
act ; but if he works without any such compulsion simply because
he wills it, if he works from what I call " freewill " and what Mr.
Maddock calls "he must " because the law of nature forces him
to do, his act is the true expression of his will. The acts of what
I call " freewill" are necessary acts ; they are determined by law,
But being free, they show what kind of a will is in the man ; and
we can accordingly judge of the character of a man only if we con-
sider the acts which he performed when he was under no con-
straint, when he was free. The acts of a slave do not show his
real character. All our ethical education aims at liberation. We
educate our children to make them free. AVe teach them the na-
ture of the moral law and as soon as they possess motive impulses
in their mind to remain in harmony with the moral law, we need
no longer put any restraint upon them, we need no more watch
them, but can leave them to themselves, or in other words, we can
give them their freedom.
Now Mr. Maddock might ask me why I use the word freedom
for a state which according to his usage of terms is slavery. He
imagines that I do it, because " it is best adapted to teach morals."
That is not my motive. My motive is that I trust it is the truest
expression of things as they actually are. Man's actions are not
" caused by laws " as Mr. Maddock says; man is not " a slave "
of laws. Man's actions are caused by "causes"; ^nd causes
which affect a man's will are called motives. If a hungry man
finds bread, he will if he is without constraint naturally and neces-
sarily eat it. Hunger is the main motive of his act of eating and
this hunger is at the time a part of himself Hunger means a want
of food, and a want of food implies the desire to eat. The desire
to eat is at the time his will. If this will is not restrained (if it is
free), it will pass into act. Would it be proper to say that this
will is the slave of his desire to eat ? This will is the man's desire
to eat. Accordingly there is no sense in saying that it is the slave
of itself.
But Mr. Maddock says, man is the slave of laws and he also
says that nature is the slave of laws. To say that man's will is
the slave of his motives is a meaningless tautology, for every free
man may be called his own slave. But to say that man is the
slave of laws (viz. the psychological laws of action) and that na-
ture is the slave of natural laws, is a palpable dualism. Natural
laws are only formulas describing the uniformities of nature.
Hungry men desire to eat is a statement of fact, or rather of
many facts which belong together. If I call this statement a law
I must not think of it as some legal authority which is outside of
the stomachs of hungry men compelling them to have a desire for
food. The actual facts are the hungry men and all hungry
men desire to eat. This uniformity is formulated in a general
statement, and the general statement is called a natural law. It
is positively erroneous and shows a trace of dualism to consider
the law of gravitation as the power that forces the stone to fall.
Gravity makes the stone fall, and gravity is a certain quality of
the stone, it is (so far as the fall is concerned) the stone itself.
The stone certainly falls according to a certain law, its fall is de-
termined by law or in other words there is a uniformity in all falls
of stones which can be described in a definite formula But there
is no sense in saying that the stones, when falling, are slaves of
that formula. Nor is there any reason to speak of men whose
freedom of action is not curtailed as slaves of the psychological
laws by which the uniformities of human action are described-^
If I have taken up this subject again and again, it is because
I believe with Mr. Maddock that we must strive for clearness of
thought, and I respect Mr. Maddock's pertinacity although I re-
gret that he does not understand what I mean by free will.
p. c.
NOTES.
T/ie Ci-iiliiry for June contains an illustrated article "Women
at an English University," (Newham College, Cambridge) 'by
Eleanor Field.
Niilio)!iil ZcitKug is the name of a new German publication
which makes its weekly appearance in Chicago. It is most ably
edited by Joseph Brucker and discusses the live, political, eco-
nomical, religious, and literary questions of the day. The first
five numbers which w.e have seen are very promising and we do
not doubt that the success of the journal is ensured.
Professor Max Miiller tells us in his article "The Discovery
of the Soul," how man came to believe in a soul. He explains to us
the historical growth of the soul-idea which was taught us mainly
by death. Death proved that besides the natural body there must
be something else in man, his life, his soul, something spiritual
which leaves the body with the last breath. This something was
conceived as an agent within and was accordingly called in Sans-
crit antaJiknrana (the agency within). This conception of the
soul as the agency within has been of great service in the evolu-
tion of our psychological ideas, but it has also been a source of
many errors. Even to-day it is not uncommon to represent the
soul as a certain something which is a distinct entity moving about
in the body. This soul-entity is either supposed to consist of a
special ethereal substance or (according to Herbart and his school)
it is said to be an immaterial point, an atom forming a centre of
energy and causing all the phenomena of soul life by interaction
with the material brain-cells. Prof. Max Miiller is no dualist, but
most representatives of the idea that the soul is an agency within,
are dualists. The errors that so naturally originate from the idea
that the soul is an agency within the body, have led to an aban-
donment of the term and gave way to what may briefly be called
the psychology of positivism. We have stated our view of the
subject at length in a series of former articles and in "The Soul
of Man," and need not go into further details here.
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